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Abstract
Health is considered to be one the main determinants of retirement decision.
A majority of empirical studies implements health using self-perceived health
status measures. According to the justification hypothesis such a method may
introduce a bias into estimation, and moreover, this bias may vary from country
to country. The aim of this thesis is to make use of a dataset rich in objective
measures of health from the second wave of Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe and to put side by side the estimates based on subjective
measures as well as IV estimates using more objective variables and thereby to
assess the magnitude of possible endogeneity and measurement error. It applies
these identification methods on the model of early exit from labour force and
discusses gender differences and specifics of given EU countries.
JEL Classification I10, J26, C35, C42
Keywords health, labour supply, retirement, measurement
error
Author’s e-mail vaclav.hausenblas@gmail.com
Supervisor’s e-mail filip.pertold@cerge-ei.cz
Abstrakt
Zdravotní stav je považován za jednu z hlavních determinant rozhodování o
odchodu do důchodu. Většina současné literatury implementuje zdraví do
empirických modelů skrze proměnné, které jsou založeny na informaci o sub-
jektivním hodnocení zdraví mezi respondenty výberových šetření. Takovéto
měření zdraví však může vnést zkreslení do výsledků těchto studií, pokud je
hodnocení závislé na sociálním a ekonomickém postavení dotazovaných. Práce
srovnává tento typ odhadů s odhady využívajícími širokou škálu informací o
zdraví z projektu Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Pro
odhad modelu předčasného odchodu do důchodu je aplikováno několik ekono-
metrických a vícerozměrných statistických metod.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Health is considered to be one the main determinats of retirement decisions,
or in more general terms – exit from labour force – even though theoretical
models do not give an unambigous answer to the question of eventual effect
on employment since health can potentially affect both utility from leisure or
consumption (a positive effect) and productivity (a negative effect). Unfortu-
nately, even in empirical framework, identification and evaluation of the effect
on worker’s decision-making is a non-trivial task. Majority of empirical studies
on labour force supply decisions implement health using self-perceived health
status measures, information that is easily obtainable in labour force surveys.
A so-called justification hypothesis suggests, however, that such a method may
introduce endogeneity bias into the estimation. According to justification hy-
pothesis people tend to exaggerate bad health as a reason of their retirement
and thus self-evaluated health becomes endogenous to employment status in
any kind of retirement model. This bias means that evaluation of health is
not independent of other factors such as job satisfaction and conditions, wages
or various other social status characteristics that correlate with employment
status. Models using such measures are supposed to overestimate the impact
that bad health has on employment status. The evidence of systematic mea-
surement error was provided by authors of studies using data from surveys in
United States.
Variables derived from self-assessed scale measures of respondent’s health
status may also suffer from a considerable random measurement error due to
linguistic and cultural differences as well as questionnaire design of a given
survey. The aim of this study is to put side by side estimates based on such
subjective measures as well as those using more objective measures and to
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assess the magnitude of possible endogeneity and measurement error. It applies
various econometric methods to identify a model of early exit from labour force
using data from the second wave of the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE).
Early exit from labour force caused by health difficulties represents an im-
portant link between social security, social insurance and health care systems.
Evaluating the weight of this linkage is a necessary step to consistently esti-
mate the effect of various health care policies. Further, both health care and
social insurance programs are now in the center of attention in many European
countries (the Czech Republic being one of them) due to an urgent need of
reforms and austerity measures within overall fiscal consolidation under pres-
sure of adverse demographic changes. Another aspect is, for instance, an issue
of credit risk. A labour market where workers easily lose income (or at least
part of it) as a consequence of random health shocks might produce a higher
number of insolvent households.
Comparison of subjective and objective measures has an important psy-
chological point. A social pressure on people without job which makes them
justify their decision and exaggerate their health condition refers to a serious
social imbalances and insufficient opportunities to realize social and economic
potential of such individuals.
In both theoretical and empirical studies a controversy whether health or
economic factors (compensations, incentives, savings and other assets) are the
main drivers of the decision persists. While on the theoretical level such contro-
versy is linked to already mentioned ambiguity of hypothetical health effect, in
empirical research it stems from aforementioned identification issues. Ignoring
these issues leads to biased predictions of retirement models and wrong policy
implications.
This study contributes on several levels. Previous analysis of the topic was
applied to the data from surveys restricted on a few developed countries and
it mostly limited its attention on male workers. We employ a new dataset
covering, besides the old EU members, some additional countries, namely the
Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland.1 The uniform design of the survey applied
in all these countries allows to maintain a high level of consistency of separate
models for different subgroups and thus makes it easier to compare the results.
1Up to now data for the Czech Republic such as Household Budget Survey, EU-SILC or
Labour Force Survey conducted by the Czech Statistical Office were rather weak in terms of
health observations.
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This comparison is important for evaluating social insurance and social security
schemes as well as labour market conditions. Furthermore, the dataset includes
both male and female respondents which further increase its information value.
The thesis also applies new methodological elements such as principal com-
ponent analysis of health to address the issue of collinearity (due to a/ low
ratio of sample size vs. number of variables, b/ nature of health measures)
and multidimensionality. Another original element is using seemingly unre-
lated regression method to test the endogeneity of subjective health variables.
Previous works were aimed at controlling for the bias in retirement modeling
while this study also addresses the quality of potential bias itself, analyzes the
differences across various countries and tries to explain them.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Part I surveys the existing the-
oretical and empirical research on retirement and retirement modelling. The
description of theoretical background given in Chapter 2 is followed by survey
of empirical implementation alternatives (Chapter 3) and related econometric
issues (Chapter 4). In the end of this part, three hypotheses, a basic research
questions for the empirical research, are formulated.
Part II provides assumptions and specification of empirical models used to
test declared hypotheses in Chapter 6. Data used for the analysis are presented
in Chapter 7 while Chapter 8 concerns with multi-dimensional nature of health.
Chapter 9 presents and discusses the results of our research and the thesis
concludes in Chapter 10.
Tables of detailed reports from regression and other relevant information
can be found in Appendix D–E.
Part I
Survey of literature
Chapter 2
Models of retirement in economic
theory
While it seems to be appropriate to begin with a definition of retirement there is
no sharp definition of this phenomenon (Gustman & Steinmeier 2007). Simple
definitions such as that retirement is an event that occurs when an individual
stops working completely are not taking into account the complexness of the
process when some people may change their job for an easier one or they just
reduce the working hours and other gradual or partial pathways to retirement.
The definition that would serve the purpose of analyzing relationship between
health and retirement would be the most general one. The rest of the study
thus pools all kinds of evidence of leaving the market such as (early) retirement,
disability or unemployment in old age and any other pathways to retirement
into a single definition. For this reason the term (early) exit from labour force
often takes the place of the term (early) retirement further on in the text.
In the early economic literature retirement was mostly regarded as invol-
untary. The reasoning behind this thought was that workers retired either
because of health limitations or when employers dismissed them from their
jobs. Such an approach was not naive but originated in times of rather under-
developed welfare state and its social security programs. In these times wide
family households and private savings as a resource for elderly were of higher
importance. Later research and further social and economic development in-
troduced a different view where retirement decisions have been considered as
rather voluntary actions. The timing of the decision would correspond to the
moment when utility from leisure overweights the compensations from work.
Current research on the topic is, in general, divided into two streams of
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thought – a static single-period wage-leisure models and life-cycle models –
according to the extent how far are individuals assumed to be forward-looking.
A comprehensive general survey of economic modeling of retirement can be
found in Leonesio (1996).
The static approach models a situation where individuals find themselves
“eligible for retirement” and weight the costs and the benefits of both alterna-
tives: to stay in the labour force or to leave to retirement. In addition to their
wages and possible pension benefits, individuals take into account various other
factors: current health status, family conditions or their workplace character-
istics and situation on labour markets.1 This is a traditional, easily applicable
but still popular approach in labour economics (Quinn 1977; Gordon & Blinder
1980).
In the second and younger approach, a life-cycle model based on the per-
manent income hypotheses allowed to integrate the expectations and dynamic
patterns of behaviour. These life-cycle economic models originally assumed
workers to be perfectly informed, smoothing their life-time income and fully
anticipating the changes in benefits and pensions and hence being able to maxi-
mize their life-cycle utility function within their life-cycle budget constraint. An
example of such model may be found in Burkhauser (1979). This element of
anticipation of large number of variables (e.g. future health status) is however
in huge contrast with modern concept of uncertainty among economic agents
and with the fact that social security systems and private pension plans are
of rather complex nature and change over time (with frequent policy reforms).
Subject to uncertainty is also a wide set of random events such as health status
shocks, adverse situation on labour market and other unanticipated macro and
micro events. This is why the life-cycle approach of modern labour economics
moved to the assumption of rational expectations.
Some literature also suggests that economists disregard non-maximizing
behaviour of individuals “who do not fully understand the incentives from their
retirement programs”.2 Some of them may plan well, but others do not plan at
all.
Further research in labour economics brought so-called dynamic structural
models to explain the timing of participation decisions as a consequence of
changes in labour market conditions or certain personal characteristics. It al-
1Recent financial crises and following economic recession had affected labour markets and
increased flows of labour force especially between unemployment and inactivity. Adverse
conditions on the market caused many people to retire earlier.
2See pp. 18 in Gustman & Steinmeier (2007).
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lows some variables to vary over time and also to control for endogeneity of some
of the key explaining variables. These improvements allowed to follow complex
causal relationships between economic policies and effects on labour markets.
This development was facilitated, to a considerable extent, by the availability of
new rich datasets, improvements in empirical methods and growing computa-
tional capacity. Perfect examples of such modeling applied to (early) retirement
analysis are in Gustman & Steinmeier (2005; 1985) or any other paper by the
same authors.
Health changes are rather random events and thus bring considerable un-
certainty into the decision-making process of an individual. As such, they can
hardly be forecast during the life-cycle and incorporated into any plans. But,
on the other hand, worsening of health with age should not surprise anyone.
The rest of this thesis is thus following the traditional approach based on static
wage-leisure theoretical framework. Optimization and rationality is constrained
to a single moment or a short-term horizon with imperfect knowledge covering
only information on recent and past events and the near future.
Chapter 3
Health and retirement in empirical
models
An individual finds himself on a budget constraint given by compensations
and old-age pension benefits. The budget curve of an older worker consist
of lines AB and BC shown in the left part of Figure 3.1. In the point C,
individual receives only old-age benefits. The line BC represents income from
partial retirement (usually earnings tested) while the slope of AB is given by
compensations from work.
His utility U , on the other hand, is a function of consumption and leisure
and is dependent on many attributes such as health status, family conditions
etc.
A situation where an individual decides to stay in the labour force is illus-
trated in the left part of the figure. A change in wage (as an outcome of adverse
shocks on labour markets or health status change) or a change in benefits (a
reward for not leaving the market early) or both may lead to retirement as
illustrated on the right side. Any change in preferences and implied change in
his utility function may unfold the indifference curve and result in a similar
effect.
The probability that the individual i, eligible for social security (old-age,
disability or any similar) benefits, is employed (works at least L hours) is a func-
tion of economic variables (wage/pension replacement ratio, savings and other
assets), job satisfaction, health status and various other social-background fac-
tors (such as marital status, family conditions, education):
P (li > L|wi, hi, Zi) = f(L,wi, hi, Zi)
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Figure 3.1: Wage-leisure labour supply framework
leisure
U
A
B
C
leisure
U
A
B
C
i
i
benefits
wage
0 0
where L is a constant given by regulatory framework of social security sys-
tem, w is wage, h a health status score(s) (let high value indicates worse health)
and Z is a set of other characteristics as indicated. The subject of empirical
research
∂f(L,w, h, Z)
∂h
is a complex formula and may in theory take both negative and positive
values as health has an impact on utility of leisure and consumption as well
as on productivity and wage. Bad health can increase the individual’s need of
consumption and demand for drugs or medical treatment. Higher consumption
require higher income which leads to higher participation. Health may also
reduce a utility from leisure and thus increase the probability of participation
(Deschryvere 2004).
A negative marginal effect, on the other hand, may be expected as bad
health h is negatively correlated with productivity and therefore wage w. It has
a negative impact on utility of consumption (of other than medical goods) and
thus decreases the need of a higher income. In a life-cycle framework bad health
also reduces life expectancy and hence the time available for consumption of
savings and other assets.
The evidence that health status is one of the most significant determinants
of retirement decision is supported by a rather large amount of empirical liter-
ature (Bazzoli 1985; Hausman & Wise 1985; Sammartino 1987). To list some
of the recent works Kalwij & Vermeulen (2008), Meijer et al. (2008) use the
data from the first wave of SHARE and confirm that European workers’ labour
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supply is significantly negatively affected by poor health.
Most of the studies limits the research on a single economy due to availabil-
ity of appropriate data. Jiménez-Martín et al. (1999) however studied the effect
of health on joint decisions of couples using European Community Household
Panel data. Especially male health was proved to be relevant to the decision
of both an individual and a whole couple. The more the household budget is
dependent on man’s income the more the effect is significant. On the opposite,
woman’s health was not such a significant covariate. Pamela Loprest & Sandell
(1995) found that bad health has greater effect on labour force participation for
men and single women than for married women. Their analysis, however, was
based on estimating reduced-form logit model of labour supply for sub-samples
of men and women separately and consequent comparison of estimated coeffi-
cients which modern statistics do not consider as a convincing method to test
hypotheses of significant deviations in gender behavioral patterns. They also
did not deal with multidimensionality of health limitation measures.
As stated above, besides his preferences worker’s, health also affects produc-
tivity and hence employers’ demand for labour of that worker. Some authors
claim that the importance of health on retirement is correlated with the level
of development of given economy. They found their argument on studies of Re-
tirement History Study, a panel data collected from 1969 to 1979, and Health
and Retirement Study, a new panel data collected from 1992 in the US. This
would imply that health is more important determinant in less developed or in
industrial countries where any health limitations represent a serious barrier to
work in major parts of its labour market. On the other hand, well-developed
countries are characterized by the generosity of social security system which
may compensate this effect.
Chapter 4
Health and retirement –
identification issues
4.1 Endogeneity and measurement error in self-
reported health variables
In order to quantify accurately the effects of various factors determining retire-
ment decisions economists should carefully allow for interactions of explana-
tory variables. The literature (Bound (1989), Bound et al. (1998) or Dwyer
& Mitchell (1998)) names two channels that can bring endogeneity issue into
retirement models with health as an explanatory variable, both of them being
relevant to using popular self-reported measures of general health:
1. Random measurement error: commonly used measures of worker’s health
based on self-reported rankings are supposed to be subject of considerable
measurement error. The data are usually focused on economic variables it is
rather rare, though, to have some better information on health at one’s disposal.
The choice of appropriate measures is thus very limited.
2. Reporting bias: First, subjective health measures may not be indepen-
dent of irrelevant factors or current state of an individual. They are subjects
to individual-specific reporting and as such are not optimal for use in an em-
pirical analysis on inter-personal level. Perception of health can be affected
by social and cultural institutions that are specific to given country or social
group. Second, response of an individual is not independent of his current
state, survey conditions as well as a specific wording of a question. Third,
the respondent may have many reasons to exaggerate or undervalue his or her
health status. Empirical retirement modeling accounts for at least two of them:
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disability benefits eligibility motivation and justification bias. Justification hy-
pothesis claims that some people exaggerate bad health status to justify their
retirement while other factors were the true determinants of their decision. In
other words, they blame their (early) retirement on health even though they re-
tired for some other reasons. Such a bias causes systematic underestimation of
health status as a determinant of labour force participation and directly rules
out pooling observations for both active and retired workers within a single
model.
Many empirical studies like those by Rust (1994); Blundell et al. (2002) use a
single self-assessed health measure to control for health in their models and thus
either ignore the endogeneity problem or argue that using self-assessed health
variable avoids other problems that come with more complex methods. Also
Galuscak (2001) analyzes retirement decisions of Czech male workers and the
effect of introduction of earnings test on participation of pensioners. Using data
from Labour Force Survey, self-perceived poor health proved to be a significant
negative determinant of the exit decision.
There are however some arguments against using more objective measures
as well. Not only it is hard to cover all the objective aspects without omitting
some specific but important variable, but it is also very difficult to summarize all
the information into one or a few numbers. Kalwij & Vermeulen (2008) use the
term “multidimensional nature of health status”. While summarisation of many
variables decreases the explanatory power of such model, including too many
variables in a model makes any interpretation of results less straightforward and
clear. For this reason some economists suggested using self-reported health
status measures instead (Bound 1989). This method allows to transfer the
problem of reducing dimensions to respondents.
One of the most elaborated attempts to implement health into economic
models was done by Meijer et al. (2008). Unlike other papers, this one deals
with complex multidimensional nature of health by using multivariate factor
analysis. They employ 24 various health indicators as dependent variables
and objective measures such as grip strength as exogenous explanatory vari-
ables. Maximum handgrip strength is used as a cross-national scaling tool
which “helps to overcome the measurement issues related to biases that arise
from subjectivity of self-reported health and health conditions due to cultural
differences across and within countries, differential physician contacts.”1 They
1See p. 7 in Meijer et al. (2008).
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also advert to the fact that maximum grip strength is a well-established tool
to predict future health conditions and mortality.
Most of the points mentioned above introduce the reasons to approach self-
reported health status in retirement models as an endogenous variable once the
research has sufficient amount of objective information to control for endogene-
ity. From this perspective, a single linear regressions explaining economic and
social behaviour of elderly cannot estimate the effects of different determinants
correctly. Endogeneity and multicollinearity induces bias in
• statistical and economical effect of health variable(s)
• statistical and economical effect of other variables that are correlated with
health (even if we have a perfect measure of health status)
4.2 Correcting for bias and other identification is-
sues
Some papers were aimed at addressing and resolving the controversy of objec-
tive versus subjective measures in econometric models. The main problem with
comparing methods of these papers lies in the fact that their methodology was
seriously dependent on specific properties and limitations of data in use.
Bound (1989) provided a very general model of labour force participation
of elderly which showed potential pros and cons of those two most common
alternative methods and served as theoretical basis for later research. It uses
one objective variable, observed mortality – a variable constructed from large
longitudinal survey data, as an instrument and proxy for health. Using data
from the Retirement and Health Survey (RHS from now on) based on a sample
of men aged from 58 to 63 and conducted during 1969–1978 in the United
States he shows that results may differ significantly according to chosen proxy
for health and method of identification.
Author defines labour-force participation, self-reported health and mortality
equations:
lf ∗ = λ1η + β1w + ε1 (4.1)
h = λ2η + β2w + ε2 (4.2)
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d∗ = λ3ν + ε3 (4.3)
w = λ4η + ε4 (4.4)
η∗ = ν + µ (4.5)
where w stands for compensation, h for self-reported health status and d∗
for mortality. A true health stock η decomposes into ν – the part of the health
that affects both productivity and mortality – and µ – the part of the health
that affects capacity to work only – such that ν and µ are uncorrelated with
each other. An asterisk indicates an unobserved, latent, variable with (lf , d)
or without (η) an observed dummy counterpart.
Further assumptions are taken: η is uncorrelated with ε1, ε2, ε4 and ν with
ε3 and thus η is not correlated with ε3. On the other hand, due to endogeneity
in unobservables (justification bias), ε1 is expected to be correlated with ε2.
As follows from equations and corresponding assumptions, both h and d
are imperfect proxies for η as they both introduce a bias in estimating (4.1).
Variable h is not independent on wages and the more objective variable d is an
incomplete measure of health which also makes it an inappropriate instrument
to h. The system of equations is moreover under-identified without assuming
adequate arbitrary exclusion restrictions.
Results indicate that using mortality to approximate health in a model of
labour participation “exaggerates the impact of economic factors and underes-
timates the impact of health by substantial margins”2 as it ignores unobserved
part of health. On the contrary, using mortality to instrument self-reported
measure, a procedure initially proposed by Stern (1989), exaggerates the im-
pact of health and underestimates the impact of economic variables, namely
compensations.
The author concludes that the method of using objective measure d to
instrument self-reported measures only multiplies the bias inherent to self-
reported measures and he recommends using the naive endogenous variable
alone instead. Moreover, he argues, endogeneity factors within self-reported
variables may cancel out each other. To improve the credibility of estimates
with both instrumental variable and proxy methods one would have to bring
2See p. 131 in Bound (1989).
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additional objective information on health or on reliability of mortality as a
proxy for health. This would both help with the identification of the model
and to get rid of the bias in estimates. Due to lack of data, the study has to sim-
ulate the magnitude of simultaneity and thus contributes mainly on theoretical
level.
Dwyer & Mitchell (1998) made another attempt to address justification
bias and measurement error in health variables, this time using Health and
Retirement Study – the first data abundant in objective information on worker’s
health stock. They approach justification bias as a significant deviation of OLS
and IV estimates. They also test for measurement error in both subjective and
more objective variables using instruments such as parents’ health, age, number
of visits to a doctor or number of children. Their model has a form of these
structural equations:
R = β1w + λ1η ∗+γ1Z1 + ε1 (4.6)
w = λ2η ∗+γ2Z2 + ε2 (4.7)
H = λ3η ∗+ε3 (4.8)
The reasoning behind justification hypotheses in their concept is that “w
is correlated with the resulting systematic measurement error ε3 because low
earners will prefer retirement leisure and use poor health to justify their early
withdrawal.”3 They expect the effect of self-reported health on early retirement
to decrease after instrumenting and to increase for the case of objective health
variables.
The authors found only little evidence of justification bias. The only vari-
able contaminated was a dummy indicator of health limitation to do a paid
job.4 Also Hausman-Wu test did not bring any evidence of measurement error
in either objective or subjective health indicators.
It is however inappropriate to apply the results of findings based on data
3See pp. 177 in Dwyer & Mitchell (1998).
4This variable is of the same nature as variable LIMITATION used in the empirical part
of this thesis. See chapter 7 for description of the dataset.
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from the United States to the European countries. It is the aim of this theses
to make a counterpart to this research on data from the EU countries.
4.3 Testing for endogeneity
Kalwij & Vermeulen (2008) accent the multidimensional nature of health and
address one weakness of instrumental variable approach. They argue that some
objective health conditions may have a direct effect on labour force participa-
tion besides the indirect one through an self-reported overall health indicator
which makes the instrumental variable method inappropriate.
Endogeneity of self-reported health is, in a framework of this omitted vari-
able approach, assumed to stem from explanatory power of such a variable on
the top of the information in a set of more objective measures. Variance in
labour force participation is thus significantly explained by self-reported vari-
able even when controlled for all observable objective measures.
Two conditions should be met to justify such a model:
1. Self-reported health variable is significantly correlated to labour force
participation.
2. Self-reported health variable remains a significant regressor even after
controlling for full set of objective exogenous regressors.
Their work applied the test on the data from the first wave of SHARE which
did not cover the Czech Republic, Poland or Ireland. Furthermore, the authors
restricted the sample on people below normal statutory retirement age in belief
that only these people need to justify their retirement decisions and bias their
responses.
There are however serious drawbacks with this test. First, the paper ignores
the differences in reporting patterns among the countries (presented later in
Chapter 7). It constructs a dummy variable signaling bad health so that peo-
ple who responded by a lower grade then “good” (on a scale of “excellent”,
“very good”, “good”, “bad” and “poor”) were classified as “bad” and all others
as “good”. There are however significant deviations from normal distribution in
the original self-reported variable and using such constructed categorical vari-
able derived from responses rules out any kind of comparability separate tests
on data from different countries as it ignores cultural and language deviations
in these subsamples.
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Second and the main problem of the presented test is its ambiguity. The
joint significance of both (sets) of variables may have two explanations: 1)
endogeneity (by omitted variable) and/or 2) invalid instrumental variables.
Let me rewrite the model used for the test more formally in
lfi = αhi + Z ′iγ1 +X ′iβ + εi (4.9)
lfi = αhi +X ′iβ + ε1i (4.10)
where for an individual i lfi is the probatility of participation, hi is a self-
reported measure, Zi is a vector of objective measures and Xi a vector of other
socio-economic variables and suppose that
hi = Z ′iγ2 + ε2i (4.11)
A rejection of Wald test of joint significance (γ1 6= 0, β 6= 0) indicates one
of these situations: 1) cov(ε1, ε2) 6= 0 but also 2) cov(Z, ε1) 6= 0 or both. If
we run the test to investigate primarily the first case, we observe a statistics
on both of the issues in a single number. The instrumental variable validity
is based on the assumption that a valide instrument a) does strongly correlate
with endogenous variable and b) does not have a direct effect (other than
through an endogenous variable) on the explained outcome variable (labor-
force participation). In a framework of OLS, this direct effect is tested by
Sargan test of correlation between instruments (in a first-stage regression) and
errors in original reduced equation (the second-stage equation with original
endogenous variable) (Wooldridge 2010).
Their results suggest that in some countries, self-reported measure does a
fair job in explaining participation without evidence of bias. And that on the
other hand, in Denmark, the Netherlands or Sweden, using only self-reported
variable leads to biased estimates. We test this heterogeneity findings using
more advanced econometric and statistical methods. The paper also does not
give any solution to retirement models that aim at evaluating the effect of poor
health on retirement.
Considerably less evidence was brought to the topic of gender differences
and its impact on retirement behaviour. Ettner (1997) suggest that being out
of the labour force may be less socially stigmatizing for women than for men
and so there can be expected less reporting bias among women.
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4.4 Further considerations
4.4.1 Overall health versus limitations to do a paid work
Since health in general is so difficult to be measured we may not be interested
in overall health of an individual and we’d rather like to focus on the part of
his health that is relevant to labour market participation. Subjective measures
may perfectly describe overall health but the relation between overall health
and disability may be very complex and may depend on specific occupation
characteristics. Similarly, a single composite index of health may not be corre-
lated with labour force participation. To give an example, a different elasticity
to health changes of a mine-worker to that of an office clerk can be expected.
A solution to this would be to ask the respondents on their limitations to do a
paid job. It is however even more likely that reporting and justification bias oc-
curs in such a capacity-to-work self-reported measure than in an overall health
measure as it demands more, and often unobserved, information.
4.4.2 Reverse causality
One of the main identification issues in applied microeconometrics is a problem
of reverse causality (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). A hypothetical causal relation-
ship (or at least its direction) is hard to be empirically proved or rejected by
simple econometric methods due to a non-experimental nature of most of the
economic data. It is usually solved by an arbitrary assumption by definition
(supported by another theory or empirical evidence) or by using structural
econometric analysis of panel data. Also using lagged values or instrumental
variables are the very popular methods to control for endogeneity.
Regarding the topic of this thesis, a threat of reverse causality problem may
arise from the fact that retirement itself may also affect health. Behncke (2009)
uses non-parametric matching methods to identify causal effects of retirement
on health using data from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). He
found out that retirement increase the risk of developing a cardiovascular dis-
ease and being diagnosed with cancer. Similar findings may be found in Bound
& Waidmann (2007); Neuman (2004). On the other hand (Mojon-Azzi et al.
2007) do not find any evidence of negative retirement effect on health. On
the other opposite, they find the evidence of less frequency of depression and
anxiety among Swiss after retiring.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and formulation of
hypotheses
Estimating effects of health on retirement is a complex and difficult task. Em-
pirical research in this area is very limited by low availablity of appropriate
data and even its perfect availability would not prevent identification prob-
lems. Multidimensional nature of health measured by objective variables and
systematic and random measurement error problems connected to self-reported
measures as well as reverse causality are the main barriers to estimate the em-
pirical models of labour supply decision in advanced age. Availability of data
also limited the research on the US economy and a few EU economies and pre-
vented from analyzing the regional specifics in terms of differences in effects on
employment or in reporting patterns.
Although the theory does not give unequivocal answer to the question of
impact of health on employment, empirical evidence from major part of re-
search concludes that bad health negatively affect labour force participation.
Hypothesis 1: Bad health has a negative marginal effect on prob-
ability of being employed.
Findings of several empirical studies suggest that labour supply of women
is less sensitive to health problems than that of men. This does not correspond
to a well-known empirical evidence that elasticity of labour supply of women
is in general higher compared to that of male workers. It may, however, be
connected with womens’ lower labour force participation. While most of the
surveys concerns of male workers, this topic is yet to be elaborated.
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Hypothesis 2: Labour force particiaption of female workers is
less sensitive to deteriorated health than those of male workers.
The studies on data from Health and Retirement Study in United States
brought the evidence of justification bias that makes self-reported health mea-
sures endogenous to employment status. Similar research on data collected
in Europe did not present any strong support of these findings. It was hy-
pothetised however that these reporting patterns may be country-specific and
may be limited to workers only of a male gender.
Hypothesis 3 (Justification hypothesis): Early inactive people
tend to exaggerate their health problems to justify their early exit
from labour force.
Part II
Empirical analysis
Chapter 6
Specifications and assumptions of
the model
The following part of the text presents an empirical model of early exit from
labour force designed for the purpose of estimating the effect of bad health
on labour force participation decisions among elderly. The analysis is divided
into four consequent steps. First, a naive model where self-perceived health is
treated as exogenous variable is specified and identified. This method provides
baseline estimates for further discussion since most of the empirical research
contents with such treatment of health. In the second step, we approach the
set of objective information about health using Principal components analysis
method to get objective regressors used later for tests of exogeneity of health
and for instrumental variable estimation . In the third step, we formulate a test
to identify the endogeneity due to the systematic reporting bias. It is based on
testing the simultaneity of reporting and labour force participation equations.
Based on the results in this test, estimation using instrumental variables is
applied in the fourth step.
A significant part of the text is devoted to description of data in use, relevant
summary statistics and specific data handling and preparation.
6.1 Health as an exogenous variable – a naive
model
In the first place a simple model of probability of being active is specified as
follows
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p∗i = αhi +X ′iβ + εi
lf =
1 if p
∗ > 0
0 if p∗ ≤ 0
(6.1)
Instead of a latent probability p∗i of being employed a dummy variable lfi
of i’s worker status is actually observed and thus an ordinary probit estimator
is applied. Labour force participation status is represented by an indicator of
having a paid job while the baseline sample consists of retirees, unemployed
and disabled. Such a pooling of these three categories is consistent with major
part of related literature and empirical studies since it allows to consider more
alternative exit routes than a sole institution of early retirement.
Three alternative variables (implying three separate estimations) of self-
perceived health, LIMITATION (dummy), HEALTH-US and HEALTH10, de-
scribed in Chapter 7 were used as proxy for respondent’s health h in separate
estimations (producing alternative estimates).
The vector Xi of control variables on demographic characteristics consists
of: the number of children and a set of dummy variables indicating years of
age,1 marital status, educational background, working status of a spouse, job in
a public sector, self-employmen indicator, place of living (rural, town or city).
To test the Hypothesis 1 claiming negative marginal effects of health on
probability of being employed a significance on 5% level of z-score statistics is
used. Z-score is the ratio of the marginal effects to the standard error of the
respective estimate and follows the standard normal distribution.
To test the Hypothesis 2 (that employment of women is less sensitive to
poor health) a Chow test is proceeded through nested model regression:
p∗i = α1hi + α2(hi ∗ femalei) + female+X ′iβ + εi
where female is a categorical variable indicating female gender. The null
hypothesis that α is constant for males and females is rejected if z-score statis-
1The social security systems in EU vary in regular retirement age. The sample was
restricted according the rules in given country . In the Czech Republic for example the
regular retirement age is systematically increasing since 1996. Women are moreover let to
retire one year earlier for every child up to four. A precise rules of retirement age in Czech
Republic and other countries that were taken into account in this thesis are shortly reviewed
in Appendix C.
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tics (following standard normal distribution) for α2 is significant on level of
5 %. This method assumes identical distribution of errors for both genders.
6.2 Health as an endogenous variable
6.2.1 Testing for endogeneity – seemingly unrelated regres-
sion equations method
In this section, we present a model which is a simplified version of a model
presented in 4.2 and adopted from Bound (1989). Following system of equations
consists of equation of labour force participation, equation of reporting health
(resp. limits to do a paid work) and equation of a latent health stock. The
simplification lies in omitting equation on wage compensation.2
p∗ = λ1η∗ + β1X1 + ε1 (6.2)
h = λ2η∗ + β2X2 + ε2 (6.3)
η∗ = γC + ν (6.4)
lf =
1 if p
∗ > 0
0 if p∗ ≤ 0
(6.5)
p∗ – probability of labour force participation (we observe only the status
lf)
h – self-reported measure of health (LIMITATION, HEALTH-US or HEALTH10)
η∗ – vector of latent variables representing health stock
X – vector of socio-demographic characteristics
C – components of health
ε1, ε2, ε3 resp. υ are disturbances, resp. vector of disturbances
cov(ε1, ε2) = ρ1 and cov(ε1, ε3) = ρ2
This time we do not focus on estimated coefficients and standard errors but
instead on correlation among equations (simultaneity). Hypothetically, there is
a common information in residuals of equations (6.6) and (6.7). In other words,
2This weakness stems from the lack of the data described in Chapter 7. A single wave of
the survey allows to observe wages only for employed respondents.
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an unexplained variance in labour force participation is present in unobserved
determinants of reporting patterns.
Equation (6.4) corresponds to an assumption that components of health can
be approximated by objective observable indicators. There are two options how
to implement such an assumption. First, to use a full set of objective indicators
in database as a proxy for health. A bunch of approximately 80 indicators on
health conditions, ADL and IADL, maximum grip strength and many others
can be used as explaining variables. Including such a number of regressors may
however entail violation of assumptions of the regression technique, namely it
can bring a multicollinearity issue.
Another option is to reduce the number of regressors and to use only the
most of the variance in the original full set. A principal component analysis
presented in 8.1 is the most natural candidate to do this job. With its help we
can obtain and make use of unique orthogonal regressors.
Maximum likelihood estimation
We deal with endogenous binary (resp. discreet limited) response variable
LIMITATION (resp. HEALTH-US and HEALTH10) and one binary outcome
variable and thus a two-stage least-square estimation (2SLS) is not an adequate
technique to identify the model (Wooldridge 2010). In correspondence with
the previous literature we can use the method of bivariate probit model which
assumes disturbances to follow a jointly normal distribution.
 ε1
εi
 |X ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 1 ρi
ρi 1
 i = 2, 3
Testing Hypothesis 3
After estimating a bivariate probit (resp. hybrid probit/ordered probit) of (6.6)
and (6.7) we tested for a statistical significance (on 5% level) of ρ = 0 constraint
of the model.
H0 : ρ = 0
H1 : ρ 6= 0
Under the null-hypotheses the correlation of disturbances is equal to zero,
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the two equations are independent and explained variables exogenous (each
to other) or all the endogeneity is explained by explanatory variables. Such
equations can be estimated separately. Under the alternative hypotheses both
equations are related through disturbances and endogeneity occurs. In this
case, both equations should be estimated simultaneously. The likelihood-ratio
test compares likelihood of the bivariate model with the sum of the logs likeli-
hood for the univariate probit models (Monfardini & Radice 2008; StataCorp
2009).
LR = −2 [l1 + l2 − lbiprobit] ∼ χ2(1)
6.2.2 Instrumental variable estimation
The aim of this section is to provide estimates of the effect of bad health and
health limitations to do a paid job free of measurement error. At least two
methods are available. First, objective variables may be directly employed
in the model. Second, a very popular econometric identification method in
economics is a method of instrumental variables. This procedure provides es-
timates more comparable with the estimates from the original “naive” model
but requires the existence of variables which a) are strongly correlated to the
endogenous variable and so indirectly influence the outcome variable and b) do
not have any direct effect on the outcome variable.3
A self-reported variable is to be instrumented with full information on re-
spondent’s health represented by principal components discussed later in the
text. Similarly to the test of endogeneity in previous section, both the outcome
variable and endogenous explaining variables are limited discreet choice or bi-
nary choice variables; hence a common two-stage least-squares method (2SLS)
is not an option to identify the model and maximum likelihood estimation has
to be applied.4 In case of LIMITATION endogenous variable a bivariate probit
was engaged. For both the two remaining alternative variables an ordered pro-
bit for first-stage and binary probit for outcome equation were estimated. See
p. 478 in Wooldridge (2002) for more details on maximum-likelihood estimators
used to estimate the model.
p∗ = α1h+ β1X1 + ε1 (6.6)
3The topic of valid instruments was elaborated in detail in the section 4.3.
4Methods of estimating all models follow Wooldridge (2010).
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h = α2C + ε2 (6.7)
All the variables keep the same labels as in the previous specification.
To testHypothesis 1 in this framework, we use the z-statistics in the same
manner as we did with the naive model in 6.1.
Testing Hypothesis 2 with IV estimates is problematic. There seem to be
no solution to test significance of differences between two IV estimtes from two
different subsamples. Instead we employ the principal components of health
directly into the model and do the same Chow test as well as within the naive
model using self-reported measures.
Chapter 7
Data
7.1 Data overview and summary statistics
The data used for the empirical analysis in this thesis come from the second
wave of Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), a unique
cross-European project with a sample of no less then 45 000 people older than
50 years from Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark,
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Ireland.1 A wide
set of variables covering health problems “(e.g. self-reported health, health
conditions, physical and cognitive functioning, health behaviour, use of health
care facilities), biomarkers (e.g. grip strength, body-mass index, peak flow),
psychological variables (e.g. psychological health, well-being, life satisfaction),
economic variables (current work activity, job characteristics, opportunities to
work past retirement age, sources and composition of current income, wealth
and consumption, housing, education), and social support variables (e.g. assis-
tance within families, transfers of income and assets, social networks, volunteer
activities)”2 are available to scientists for multidisciplinary analysis.
There are two types of micro units, individuals and households, both link-
able through a unique id numbers. Up to four members of a single households
are interviewed which may be exploited to control for joint decisions of family
members and interdependencies in behaviour of spouses.
The sample used to estimate the model of early exit decision was restricted
to workers and retirees up to ten years far from the age of regular retirement
in given country. An overview of stylized facts about retirement in countries
1The SHARE dataset contains also data from Austria but these were dropped due to the
low size of its sample.
2SHARE-Project (2009)
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covered in this study is available in Appendix C. Appendix B gives a full list
of variables used for the analysis.
Three variables on respondent’s health that will serve as both explanatory
and explained variables are of special interest, though. A question asking for
evaluation of general health has a form of US-standardized five-rank scaled
choice from “excellent”, “very good”, “good”, “bad” and “poor” (HEALTH-
US from now on). Another question on general health with scale ranging
from 1 to 10 (HEALTH10), where higher value means better health, and a
binary-response question on limitations preventing from doing a paid work
(LIMITATION) are asked.
Table 7.1 presents summary statistics on probability of being out of the
labour force (columns “Exit”) and the key health variables for both inactive
(and unemployed) and active workers. We can observe significant heterogeneity
in surveyed countries both in terms of exit hazard and reporting health. A sub-
stantial differences are evident across the countries but also between male and
female respondents. Polish and Spanish women have the highest propensity to
early exit while on the other side of the spectrum are Swiss and Swedish men.
Polish and Czech males feel to be the most unhealthy while Greek and Swiss
males feel in average very healthy. Czech males and females are also those
who report health limitations to do a paid job most frequently (for detailed
statistics on health in the Czech Republic see Table 7.2).
Reporting patterns of HEALTH-US and the sample ditribution of this vari-
able is presented in Figure 7.1. Obviously, self-reported health variable is not
suitable for direct cross-country comparison. For some of the countries, the
distribution of self-perceived health is biased towards one of the extremes. In
case of Poland, the curve does not even have a single peak. This observation
suggests sampling issues or, which is more likely, a country-specific response
patterns.3
In order to analyze the source of the biases, the response distribution is
to be confronted with a distribution of strongly correlated objective variable.
Figure 7.2 presents a table of histograms of maximum grip strength which is
considered to be a good indicator of overall health and a proxy for mortality
(Ling et al. 2010; Sasaki et al. 2007; Gale et al. 2007). Comparison of the
two tables covering the same sample indicates that the sampling was probably
3See Börsch-Supan & Jürges (2005) for a description of sampling methodology of SHARE
in detail.
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of self-perceived health by country
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Source: SHARE, author’s computations.
correct while specific response patterns are to be blamed for the mismatches in
the first table.
A dummy counterpart to the explained (outcome) variable, labour force
participation, is plotted over HEALTH-US in Figure 7.3. The aim of this
thesis is to analyze observed relationship in econometrically rigorous manner,
and to get a consistent bias-free estimates that would serve to evaluate the
effect of policies and to make reliable forecasts.
SHARE is still a new project that is yet to fully bear its fruits. Only two
regular waves were carried out and the Czech Republic joined the survey in
the second one. In early 2011 a new wave was conducted. Its results will allow
to make more advanced models with panel data analysis possible. So far the
major problem of the survey is a discontinuity of questionnaires between the
two subsequent waves. Such an issue rules out possibility of panel data analysis
of some part of variables and prevents researcher from inferring dynamic and
individual-specific effects. The new wave wil however introduce new interesting
features such as taking blood samples and other new health measures.4
4For more information about SHARE project see www.share-project.org.
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of maximum grip strength by country
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Table 7.2: Summary statistics – Czech males and females
Male Female
Inactive Active Total Inactive Active Total
LIMITATION* .35 .11 .20 .32 .11 .21
HEALTH-US 3.20 2.57 2.82 3.15 2.58 2.83
HEALTH10 6.81 7.83 7.42 6.92 7.85 7.44
age 58.30 56.95 57.32 55.19 54.30 54.70
severe conditions* .38 .09 .17 .16 .07 .11
mild conditions* .73 .57 .61 .67 .51 .58
ADL* .25 .00 .07 .16 .03 .09
IADL* .33 .02 .10 .25 .07 .15
max. grip strength 45.42 50.71 49.27 29.36 31.52 30.57
overweight* .46 .59 .55 .19 .17 .18
obesity* .27 .21 .23 .12 .08 .10
mentally ill* .25 .08 .13 .36 .23 .29
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of labour force participation with respect to
self-perceived health
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Chapter 8
Multidimensional nature of health
8.1 Principal Component Analysis
Early empirical studies of health effects on labour supply suffered from lack
of sufficient number of objective measures and thus the statistical models em-
ployed were either underspecified or gave less credible estimates, an outcome of
using weak instruments and accepting too restrictive constraints. The dataset
available for the empirical research in this thesis includes over 100 variables
on respondent’s health.1 This allows to significantly improve our ability to
instrument subjective variables but at the same time it brings few additional
difficulties:
1. Data sample consists of about 600 to 1200 observations per country,
which means about 300 to 600 respondents of each gender. For a dataset of
such a size, a large number of 100 binary variables makes the estimation very
difficult. It is very probable that a perfect correlation with explained variable
occurs and some observations and variables have to be automatically dropped.
2. Over-identification of the model by too many variables.
3. Interpreting any model of more than 100 variable is uncomfortable as we
have no idea of an overall health effect.
From this perspective we prefer to work with lower number of variables
and so we seek for a way to reduce the number of dimensions of our data.
Fortunately, health variables are assumed to be very correlated with each other.
While this assumption implies a collinearity problem for he regressions it also
offers a possibility of reducing the dimensions through a so-called principal
component analysis (PCA from now on).
1See Appendix B that for a full list of variables used for the analysis.
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PCA is a summarisation technique involving linear orthogonal transforma-
tion (rotation) of some original data resulting in a new data where orthogonal
columns (components) are ordered according to the amount of variance of orig-
inal dataset they contain. Dropping some of the last components and keeping
only the major part of the variance for further analysis means getting rid of the
noise within the data. The procedure is fully described in (Meloun & Militky
2002; 2005) and therefore we restrict the description of the method on brief
matrix formalization.
Let D be the [n×m] data matrix of n observations and m variables, where
m < n. By centering and standardizing DT we get to XT . The basis for
PCA is a covariance matrix C = XXT . In eigenanalysis we find a solution
to X = WΣV and obtain a diagonal matrix of square roots of eigenvalues Σ
and matrix of eigenvectors (of a matrix C) W . Eigenvectors correspond to the
principal components and eigenvalues to the amount of variance relevant to cor-
responding principal component. Both matrices are then sorted by eigenvalues
(while preserving pairs of eigenvector-eigenvalue).
We are interested in a projection Y = W Ti X = ΣiV Ti and it is usual to
restrict on the first i <= max{m,n} components sorted by eigenvalues and
hence to get the major part of variance from original data D into low number
of variables (columns) in Y .
8.2 Application of PCA on a dataset of health
measures and indicators
Figure 8.1 presents a screeplot from the application of PCA to the full set of ob-
jective measures and indicators from SHARE data.2 The sample is unrestricted
and contains all the countries and respondents participating in SHARE survey.
It is a plot of sorted eigenvalues of a correlation matrix. This graph is used to
assess the appropriate number of principal components that are to be used for
further analysis (a non-linear regressions in case of this thesis).
There are two alternative popular rules of thumb to set the number of
“useful” components:
2By full set we mean all the available variables (both continuous and dummy indicators)
except for variables on general self-assessed health (SPHUS) and health limits in doing paid
work – LIMITATION, all the variables are listed in Appendix B.
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Figure 8.1: Screeplot from PCA of health on a pooled data sample
0
2
4
6
8
10
Ei
ge
nv
al
ue
s
0 20 40 60 80
Number
Scree plot of eigenvalues
Source: author’s computations.
1. Use all the components up to the one where the curve of eigenvalues (in
a screeplot) becomes flat.
2. Use all the components of eigenvalue higher or equal to one.
The graph shows that health spreads a multidimensional space difficult to be
summarized into one composite index since even the tighter of the two rules
leads to keep at least 5 to 10 components.
Both these guidelines are practical while using PCA as a visual summarisa-
tion and interpretation technique, the most common use of this method. But
the first principal components chosen by these rules of thumb do not necessar-
ily have to be the components most relevant to the specific empirical economic
model. If we do not want to lose even subtle but statistically and economi-
cally significant information we should rather think of some more sophisticated
mechanism that picks up the right components. The technique we make use of
in this place is a stepwise procedure that starts estimating the reporting equa-
tion of the model with all components and drop the least statistically significant
step-by-step until only components of a significance above a given level remain
in the regression. All the three variables of self-assessed health were given their
significant regressors separately.
We run the PCA prior to the regressions. The samples of all the countries
are pooled into one so that the we achive the highest possible comparability
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across the regressions. It is worth mentioning that the relationship between
the general self-reported health measures and most of the principal compo-
nents appeared to be highly nonlinear. Namely the first principal component
exhibited exponential relationship to all the three variables. This fact is ex-
tremely important for those models whose identification is based on a normality
assumption. For example, IV estimators disregarding such detail would lead
to highly diverging and inconsistent results.
Chapter 9
Results
9.1 The naive model
The first econometric model with the simplest specification was estimated by a
probit maximum likelihood estimator in terms of marginal effects on probability
of being employed evaluated at the mean of the variable holding other covariates
constant. A separate model for each country was estimated and thus the size of
coefficients reported in Table 9.1 serves for rather illustrative purposes. Details
can be found in Appendix D in Tables Table D.1 on page VIII, Table D.3 on
page IX and Table D.5 on page X for men and Tables D.7, D.9 and D.11 for
women.
All the estimated models reported significant negative correlation between
bad self-perceived health and probability of being active, which means thatHy-
pothesis 1 should not be rejected under the assuptions of the model. These
findings only confirm what previous studies suggested. Unlike in Kalwij & Ver-
meulen (2008) this holds for all the countries engaged in SHARE. Moreover,
estimated coefficients and variables of interest (LIMITATION, HEALTH-US,
HEALTH10) vary only moderately across the sample. Below-average health
seems play less importante role in men’s early exit decision in Greece, Italy
and Sweeden. On the opposite, labour supply of elderly in the Czech Republic
and Belgium seems to be very sensitive to deteriorated health.
The test of Hypothesis 2 based on significance of the interaction term
gender ∗ health accepted the assumption that female labour supply is less sen-
sitive to deteriorating health in Switzerland and Germany. For other countries,
estimates followed the same pattern but relevant z-statistics were not signifi-
cant.
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Table 9.1: Health and employment of elderly: marginal effects
country DE SE NL SP IT FR DM
males
LIMITATION o -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.44***
HEALTH-US -0.18*** -0.078*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.06* -0.08*** -0.11***
HEALTH10 0.09*** 0.071*** 0.12*** 0.054** 0.04* 0.08*** 0.08***
females
LIMITATION o -0.25*** -0.50*** -0.31*** -0.13* -0.11 -0.26*** -0.54***
HEALTH-US -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.07** -0.05* -0.08*** -0.14***
HEALTH10 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.05** 0.1***
country GR CH BE CZ PO IR
males
LIMITATION o -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.48*** -0.5*** -0.29*** -0.5***
HEALTH-US -0.05** -0.07*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.09*** -0.11**
HEALTH10 0.04** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05*
females
LIMITATION o -0.19* -0.28** -0.27*** -0.56*** -0.27*** -0.26**
HEALTH-US -0.03 -0.07** -0.09*** -0.2*** -0.11*** -0.07
HEALTH10 0.03 0.03 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06*
*
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, o indicates discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Some of the control variables on demographic conditions revealed interesting
results. Without regard to their origin, self-employed people are less likely to
exit prematurely, civil employees practice this behaviour in all the countries
except the Czech Republic and Poland, the only two post-communist countries
in the sample, where these people exit prematurely. Also secondary school and
university educated people tend to stay active until a regular retirement age.
The results are in line with Jiménez-Martín et al. (1999) who brought the ev-
idence that couples often make their exit decisions jointly. Especially women’s
employment is significantly sensitive to the status of the spouse.
Age dummy variables responded well to specifics of given social system
schemes. In case of the Czech Republic, for instance, where the early retirement
is allowed no sooner then three years before a full retirement age, the last two
included age dummy indicators (the last dummy indicating the last year before
regular retirement age was set as baseline and therefore dropped from the
regression) were not significant. In general, coefficients on age dummies tend
to decrease as the age approaches the regular retirement tage, fully in line with
intuitive assumption of decreasing probability of being active.
As follows from Chapter 4.1, the evidence on health effects is to be taken
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with caution and should not serve as a basis for too strong implications. Later
in the text, some alternative estimates are presented.
9.2 Test of exogeneity
In a similar way as in case of the naive model, the tests of exogeneity were
conducted for all the countries in our sample and this time even for males
and females separately. For the sake of brevity only ρ values, its standard
errors and level of significance relevant to acceptance (or rejection) of the null
hypotheses are reported in the columns (2) of Table 9.2 for males and Table 9.3
for females. These tables further present results of both the naive regression
and the IV estimation described later on.
As for the results for men, the presented figures clearly distinguish LIMI-
TATION variable from the two remaining, HEALTH-US and HEALTH10. The
test conducted with the model using LIMITATION variable rejected the null
hypotheses of independent equations in most of the samples. Endogeneity issue
thus arises in case of this variable in all tha countries with only two exceptions
– France and Ireland. The interpretation of such differences among variables
would be that respondents are influenced by the context of the question dur-
ing the interview. A question “Do you have any health problem or disability
that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?” in a clear refer-
ence to reposndent’s working status may impose more incentive for a biased
response than a general question like “Would you say your health is...” or “On
a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 describes the worst imaginable condition and 10
describes the best imaginable condition, how do you rate your health in gen-
eral?” respectively (Survey of Health & in Europe 2006). Also the fact that
respondents reveal more specific part of their health in LIMITATION variable
may contribute to higher significance of the simultaneity. Lack of information
about respondent’s health in objective variables would cause this.
The positive and negative signs of estimates of ρ are in line with the prior as-
sumptions and predictions. Both LIMITATION and HEALTH-US, which grade
worse health by higher values, were assigned negative values, while HEALTH10
which grade better health by higher numbers corresponds to positive coefficient
of correlation.
Let’s interpret the ρ value on the example of HEALTH10 variable which is
constructed in a way that higher number means better health. If an individual
exaggerates his or her health problems and reports lower grade than the true
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one a negative residual in reporting equation occurs. When ρ is positive, this
negative residual implies a negative residual in the participation equation and
thus the true (fitted) probability of being employed is higher than the one
observed. In this case an inactive (unemployed) individual reported worse
health than the objective measures suggested.
As for the results for women, estimates do not distinguish variables as they
do distinguish countries. France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany and Ireland
do not show any sign of systematic reporting bias among women as all the
other countries do. Significant level of simultaneity was evident especially in
the Czech Republic, Sweeden but also in Netherlands and Poland.
9.3 IV estimates
A summary of results from the IV regressions is presented in the same ta-
bles. Columns (3) list the marginal effects the variable in question has on
the probability of being employed evaluated at the mean of this covariate, all
other covariates keeping constant. Again, each value represents an independent
estimate for each country.
For a brief comparison with the model treating self-perceived health as
exogenous variable see the marginal effects estimates in columns (1). The
difference between these two types of estimates carries the opposite sign than
justification hypothesis suggested.1 The importance of health as an explanatory
variable considerably increased with IV method of estimation which indicates
either a random measurement error issue in all the three self-reported health
status variables or mispesification of the reporting structural equation. Note
that the dummy variable LIMITATION seems to be less prone to these errors
(as we observe lower differences between IV and original estimates) but more
likely there is just a larger contra-effect of justification bias as exogeneity test in
section 9.2 suggested. The results are now also much more comparable across
all the three variables.
R2 (resp. McFadden’s pseudo R2 in case of binary response LIMITATION
variable) are not reported in the table but they allowed to get the picture of
goodness of fit of the “first-stage” reporting equation 6.7.2 It showed how far a
1Let us remind that the IV estimates were expected to show lower importance of health
then the naive estimates as being free of systmic exxageration of health by inactive workers
2The term “first-stage” is in quotation marks as the model was not estimated in a two-
stage regression. The R2 values come from auxiliary regressions.
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self-perceived health can be explained by objective variables. The level, which
was usually about 50 %, is high enough not to call the instruments weak. It also
has a lot to do with the amount of measurement error in a given endogenous
variable. The more we are able to explain the variance in endogenous variable
the less random measurement error we observe.
The differences in marginal effects among the countries did not change dra-
matically. The Czech Republic remains on the top of the list while Italy, Greece
or Poland stay behind on the tail. Getting rid of the measurement error, the
model has been highly improved (in terms of significance of estimated coef-
ficients) in Ireland, Greece or Italy. Differences among countries are further
analyzed in Chapter 9.4.
Hypothesis 1 was not rejected even in a framework of IV regression. Es-
timates less affected by systematic bias proved to be even more significant,
probably because of getting rid of the random measurement error inherent to
all kinds of variables based on subjectively perceived measures.
Hypothesis 2 claiming that labour force participation of women is less
sensitive to changes in health was tested by a Chow test putting principal
components of health directly into the outcome equation and was accepted
within the models of early exit behaviour in Switzerland, the Czech Republic
and France. Detailed results of the test are reported in Appendix D.
9.4 Health and wages
The differences in marginal effects among different countries may be explained
by differences on the demand side of the labour market. When productivity
(and consequently a wage) of a worker is more dependent on his health, a
greater effects shall be assumed.
Data from a single wave of the survey do not allow to include wages and
other compensations directly into the econometric model as we do observe this
information only for active respondents. To confirm the intuition suggesting
that the higher is the dependence of wages on health, the greater effect health
has on participation, we include a “meta analysis” of results from all the es-
timated regressions. The effect of health on probability of early exit is to be
compared with correlation between wages and health for all the countries in
the sample. Figure 9.1 illustrates the relationship for active male participants
of SHARE. Apparently higher marginal effect corresponds to a higher corre-
lation between wages and health. What is more, we assume the slope to be
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Figure 9.1: Health effect on participation vs. wage dependence on
health
The vertical axis represents marginal effects on variables of health, the horizon-
tal axis represents correlation between wages and health in given country.
highly underestimated due to the fact that early inactive (unemployed) workers
had to be dropped from the sample (as we do not observe their hypothetical
wages) and we assume the correlation between their health and wages to be
significantly higher.
The workhorse of the relationship are the Czech Republic with the greatest
effect of health on employment and wages and Italy being on the opposite side of
the cluster. The reasoning behind this is that in more heavy-industry-oriented
or let’s say labour intensive economies decline in health capacity implies more
serious barrier to employment than in an economy more oriented on commerce
and services. If in the economy a worker’s wage is related to his health, this
worker has lower incentives to stay on the labour market when his health dete-
riorates. On this place, we would like to remind the reverse causality problem
again. Not only health can affect the level of wage but also higher wage may
contribute (through higher spending on health care) to better health and and
vice versa.
Although we did not provide a rigorous test of the relationship, the analysis
suggests the need to implement the relationship between wages and health
into the model of early exit behaviour as another endogenous covariate with
a separate structural equation once new waves of SHARE and new data are
available.
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9.5 Discussion
Previous analysis of SHARE in Kalwij & Vermeulen (2008) did not provide a
sharp evidence of endogeneity in responses. Howeever, it suggested existence
of differences among countries engaged in the survey. Advanced econometric
methods presented in this study showed results which are basically in line with
findings by Dwyer & Mitchell (1998) once we consider only male respondents.
In that case there is an evidence of justification bias in variable on health lim-
itations (LIMITATION) but its magnitude and effect on the outcome variable
seems to be rather low. Only two countries exhibited biased responses from
their inhabitants in a sense that all the three variables are suspected from bias;
these are the Czech Republic and Sweden. Otherwise, we have seen that the re-
sponse patterns are quite homogeneous across the countries in question. On the
other hand, responses of females were independent on differences in questions
on their health in the questionaire as they were dependenton nationality.
While the method of seemingly unrelated regression allows for diagnosing
the endogeneity problem, it cannot give us any clear inference on the actual ef-
fect on estimates – the size of possible bias. Neither does it control for random
measurement error, another issue related to health variables in econometric
models. Method of instrumental variables estimation provided estimates less
affected by endogeneity and random measurement error. These two issues have
the opposite impacts on the estimates of imporatance of health. While system-
atic error (due to justification bias) increase the effect, random measurement
error in variable decreases the significance of the effect on the outcome vari-
able – the probability of staying on the labour market. What we observe in
differences between the original and the IV estimates is a sum of these two
“contradictory” effects. A comparison of IV and normal estimates thus gives
ambiguous answer to the question of justification hypothesis. But using IV
analysis at least provided more reliable tests of Hypothesis 1 (concerning sig-
nificance of the negative effect of subnormal health on participation). To test
Hypothesis 2 (concerning females’ lower sensitivity to health in therms of par-
ticipation) we had to employ principal components of health directly into the
reduced form outcome equation.
Finally, we do not recommend to continue using IV method to control for
endogeneity due to reporting bias in retirement models unless more theoreti-
cal and empirical analysis is devoted to the reporting equation specification.
We observed highly nonlinear relation ship between principal components and
9. Results 47
subjective measures of health. Potential misspecification in this part of the
structural model would lead to bias in fitted endogenous explaining variable
and would result in biased estimates of coefficients in the outcome equation.
On this place, we would recommand using the objective information instead,
whenever the data are available.
Principal component analysis did a great job by summarizing multidimen-
sional set of information on health into a low number of variables useful in
regressions. This technique popular for the purpose of visual interpretation
of multidimensional data allowed for extracting effective part of information
spread in too wide data matrix. It allowed to analyze the simultaneity issue
(Hypothesis 3) and also to employ the objective variables directly into the
outcome equation of the model to double-check the test of Hypothesis 2.
The presented models controled for reporting biases as sources of endo-
geneity. Nevertheless, they still did not allow to control for potential reverse
causality issue and hence we should rather avoid implying causal effects and
stay with using the less bold term “association” instead of “causality”.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis met most of the aims it has taken. It confirmed that bad health
is associated with lower probability of older men and women being employed
across all the countries participating in the second wave of Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement regardless of researcher’s choice between self-percieved
and objective measures. It showed that in case of the Czech Republic, France
and Switzerland this effect is significantly lower for women than for men and
that it increases with the magnitude how far are wages correlated with health.
The central point of the thesis lies elsewhere, though. It was shown that in-
active people in most of the surveyed countries tend to underrate their health,
which brings endogeneity issue into identification of empirical retirement mod-
els which use variables based on subjective measures of health that may result
in biased (underestimated) and less efficient estimates of coefficients on these
variables. Using objective variables increases the size of estimated effect by
which health influences employment. This poses a question on employing self-
reported measure of health in retirement modelling. Yet, we appreciate includ-
ing these measures in surveys as they help to analyze social and psychological
conditions of respondents. They may also contribute to separate the supply
and the demand side of the analysed association between health and labour
force particiaption.
Nevertheless, using objective information to measure health is a non-trivial
task as well. We showed that health is of rather multi-dimensional nature and
therefore cannot be easily summarized into a single composite index. Further-
more, using instrumental variable method may introduce additional bias if the
non-linear relationship between self-percieved health and objective measures of
health is ignored.
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Models of retirement are of a complex nature. Instead of aiming to get
the most general and best-fitted empirical model, we decided to restrict the
explanatory power of our models to capture and analyse specific isolated re-
search questions. Health changes are exemplary cases of unanticipated random
events that cannot be easily controlled for in advanced life-cycle models. In
this regard our simple static wage-leisure models do not lose on generality.
While the presented analysis successfully empirically tested most of the hy-
potheses, much work in this area is yet to be done. Adjustment for differences in
social security and social insurance systems in the presented models was limited
on controling for normal and early retirement age thresholds in given countries.
With data from new waves of SHARE project, it will be possible to implement
replacement ratios and other incentive measures into the model. Observing
present wages of future retirees will also allow for better distinguishing labour
supply and labour demand. Longitudinal character of the survey will also allow
us to apply a panal data analysis and thus control for individual-specific and
time-specific effects. Dynamic properties such as sudden health changes, health
shocks, and their impact on labour force will be subject of further analysis.
Interesting area of research that deserve an attention of labour economists
is the impact of recent economic recession on early and regular retirement
behavioural patterns and changes in health elasticity of labour supply and
demand.
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Appendix A
Estimation
A.1 MLE estimators
Bivariate probit model with and without an endogenous dummy regressor
p∗ = λ1η∗ + β1X1 + ε1
h = λ2η∗ + β2X2 + ε2
where we observe the participation status lf in a way that
lfi =
1 if p
∗
i > 0
0 if p∗i ≤ 0
The log-likelihood to be maximalized is written as:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
{lfihilnΦ2(λ1η∗ + β1X1;λ2η∗ + β2X2; ρ)
+ lfi(1− hi)ln[Φ(λ1η∗ + β1X1)− Φ2(λ1η∗ + β1X1;λ2η∗ + β2X2; ρ)]
+ (1− lfi)hiln[Φ(λ2η∗ + β2X2)− Φ2(λ1η∗ + β1X1;λ2η∗ + β2X2; ρ)]
+ (1− lfi)(1− hi)ln[1− Φ(λ1η∗ + β1X1)− λ2η∗ + β2X2)
− Φ2(λ1η∗ + β1X1;λ2η∗ + β2X2; ρ)]
assuming
E[ε1|η∗, X1, X2] = E[ε2|η∗, X1, X2] = 0
A. Estimation II
V ar[ε1|η∗, X1, X2] = V ar[ε2|η∗, X1, X2] = 1
Cov[ε1, ε2|η∗, X1, X2] = ρ
Mixed-process bivariate models of probit / ordered probit were estimated
using STATA cmp command following Roodman (2009).
Appendix B
List of variables
number SHARE notation thesis notation description
0 ep005_ outcome variable employed
1 ph061_ LIMITATIONS o any limitation to do a paid
job
2 sphus HEALTH-US excellent, very good,
good, bad, poor
3 ph060 HEALTH10 scale 1–10, (the higher the
better health)
4 mstat marital status o married
5 ep005_ spouse’s status o spouse is employed
6 ch001_ num. of children number of children
7 areabldg lives in a city o lives in a city
8 areabldg lives in a town o lives in a town
9 areabldg lives in rural o lives in countryside
10 ep009_ ep019_ ep051_ ep055_ civil employee o civil employee
11 ep009_ ep051_ self_employed o work as self-employed
12 isced_r secondary ed. o secondary school educa-
tion
13 isced_r university ed. o universtity education
o indicates a dummy/indicator variable.
B. List of variables IV
number variable description
1 ph006d1 doctor told you had: heart attack
2 ph006d2 doctor told you had: high blood pressure or hypertension
3 ph006d3 doctor told you had: high blood cholesterol
4 ph006d4 doctor told you had: stroke
5 ph006d5 doctor told you had: diabetes or high blood sugar
6 ph006d6 doctor told you had: chronic lung disease
7 ph006d7 doctor told you had: asthma
8 ph006d8 doctor told you had: arthritis
9 ph006d9 doctor told you had: osteoporosis
10 ph006d10 doctor told you had: cancer
11 ph006d11 doctor told you had: stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer
12 ph006d12 doctor told you had: parkinson disease
13 ph006d13 doctor told you had: cataracts
14 ph006d14 doctor told you had: hip fracture or femoral fracture
15 ph006d15 doctor told you had: other fractures
16 ph006d16 doctor told you had: alzheimer’s disease, dementia, senility
17 ph006d17 doctor told you had: benign tumor
18 ph006dno doctor told you had: none
19 ph006dot doctor told you had: other conditions
20 ph010d1 bothered by: pain in back, knees, hips or other joint
21 ph010d2 bothered by: heart trouble
22 ph010d3 bothered by: breathlessness
23 ph010d4 bothered by: persistent cough
24 ph010d5 bothered by: swollen legs
25 ph010d6 bothered by: sleeping problems
26 ph010d7 bothered by: falling down
27 ph010d8 bothered by: fear of falling down
28 ph010d9 bothered by: dizziness, faints or blackouts
29 ph010d10 bothered by: stomach or intestine problems
30 ph010d11 bothered by: incontinence
31 ph010d12 bothered by: fatigue
32 ph010dno bothered by: no symptoms
33 ph010dot bothered by: other symptoms
34 ph011d1 drugs for: high blood cholesterol
35 ph011d2 drugs for: high blood pressure
36 ph011d3 drugs for: coronary diseases
37 ph011d4 drugs for: other heart diseases
38 ph011d5 drugs for: asthma
39 ph011d6 drugs for: diabetes
40 ph011d7 drugs for: joint pain
41 ph011d8 drugs for: other pain
42 ph011d9 drugs for: sleep problems
B. List of variables V
number variable description
43 ph011d10 drugs for: anxiety or depression
44 ph011d11 drugs for: osteoporosis, hormonal
45 ph011d12 drugs for: osteoporosis, other
46 ph011d13 drugs for: stomach burns
47 ph011d14 drugs for: chronic bronchitis
48 ph011dno drugs for: none
49 ph011dot drugs for: other
50 ph041_ use glasses
51 ph048d1 difficulties: walking 100 metres
52 ph048d2 difficulties: sitting two hours
53 ph048d3 difficulties: getting up from chair
54 ph048d4 difficulties: climbing several flights of stairs
55 ph048d5 difficulties: climbing one flight of stairs
56 ph048d6 difficulties: stooping, kneeling, crouching
57 ph048d7 difficulties: reaching or extending arms above shoulder
58 ph048d8 difficulties: pulling or pushing large objects
59 ph048d9 difficulties: lifting or carrying weights over 5 kilos
60 ph048d10 difficulties: picking up a small coin from a table
61 ph048dno difficulties: none of these
62 ph049d1 difficulties: dressing, including shoes and socks
63 ph049d2 difficulties: walking across a room
64 ph049d3 difficulties: bathing or showering
65 ph049d4 difficulties: eating, cutting up food
66 ph049d5 difficulties: getting in or out of bed
67 ph049d6 difficulties: using the toilet, incl. getting up or down
68 ph049d7 difficulties: using a map in a strange place
69 ph049d8 difficulties: preparing a hot meal
70 ph049d9 difficulties: shopping for groceries
71 ph049d10 difficulties: telephone calls
72 ph049d11 difficulties: taking medications
73 ph049d12 difficulties: doing work around the house or garden
74 ph049d13 difficulties: managing money
75 ph049dno difficulties: none of these
76 orienti orientation to date, month, year and day of week
77 mental_ill cathegory of EURO-D depression scale
78 iadl limitations with instrumental activities of daily living
79 adl number of limitations with activities of daily living
80 maxgrip max. of grip strength measure
81 numeracy numeracy score: mathematical performance
82 bmi body mass index
Appendix C
Retirement age in surveyed
countries
* The normal retirement age in the Czech Republic is in a continuous progress
since 1996. It gradually increase by two months every year from 60 until it
reaches the age of 65. The age of retirement for women is lowered by the
number of children by up to four years. This age gradually increase by four
months every year starting at 57 (53 for women with five children) and reaching
65 (62 for women with at least four children).
SHARE code country regular retirement early retirement
women men men/women
23 Belgium 65 64 60
28 Czech Republic* approx 61.5 approx 56 to 59 3 years before
18 Denmark 65 65 60
17 France 60 60 -
12 Germany 65 65 63
19 Greece 65 60 60/55
30 Ireland 65 65 60
16 Italy 65 60 57
14 Netherlands 65 65 60
29 Poland 65 60 60/55
13 Sweden 65 65 61
15 Spain 65 65 60
20 Switzerland 65 64 63/61
Appendix D
Regression reports
Explanatory notes
Significance levels:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
o indicates a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
D. Regression reports VIII
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Appendix E
Content of Enclosed DVD
There is a DVD enclosed to this thesis which contains Stata source codes and
this thesis in a .pdf file.
• Folder 1: Source codes
• Folder 2: This thesis
